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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ZONING
AND PROPERTY RIGHTS
FOREWORD: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF LAND USE
REGULATION
ARTHUR T DENZA U*
BARY I WEINGAST**
This forward focuses on economic and political aspects of local
land use controls. Our purpose is to bring the logic of economic mar-
kets and the economic interpretation of property right systems to bear
on the problem of land use. With a grounding in the mechanisms
that motivate uncoordinated economic decisionmakers, we may un-
derstand something about the pattern and consequences of location
decisions, particularly as they relate to problems of incompatible uses
of adjacent property. This serves to illucidate the mechanics of the
price system and the signals which confront decisionmakers. We
then develop the rationale for land use regulation concerning poten-
tial problems of incompatible uses. We argue that there is no justifi-
cation for comprehensive land use control. This is followed by a
* Mr. Denzau is Associate Professor of Economics and Research Associate at the
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discussion of the political consequences of land use regulation and
the biases induced by the political system. Our point is that land use
control, like many other forms of regulation with laudable goals, af-
fords politicians opportunities to pursue substantially different pur-
poses from the stated rationale for controls. We argue that land use
controls are more likely to serve political ends than to solve problems
that occur through uncoordinated decisions over land use.
I. THE CAPITALIZATION PROCESS
In general, the price of an asset reflects its potential for the produc-
tion of income as well as its potential value in consumption. This
includes the various uses to which the asset may be put as well as the
risks associated with its use. Non-pecuniary aspects become particu-
larly important in the case of land and housing. Consider two identi-
cal houses on identical pieces of land. Potential buyers generate
market forces that act to equalize their prices. If they are not equally
priced, then prospective homebuyers find it advantageous to move to
the one with the lower price to the exclusion of the overvalued one,
thus bringing prices into line. The same process, however, implies
that the market can sustain substantial differences in the price of
housing, even when the physical dwelling and plot of land is the
same, if important differences exist in other dimensions relevant to
the housing consumer. If, for example, one of the two otherwise
equal houses is in the flight path of an airport, the noise inconven-
ience will be factored-i.e., capitalized-into the value of the home.
The process of capitalization follows the preferences of individuals
who are current and potential home buyers. For the case of income-
producing assets, this includes all factors affecting the possibility for
deriving income.
Other factors whose importance becomes capitalized into the value
of a house include undesirable activities in the neighboring areas
(e.g., factories, sources of pollution, major highways, garbage
dumps); quality of municipal services (quality of schools and crime
levels are of paramount importance here); and regulations controlling
the building of new housing or restraining the ability to build low
income housing in upper income municipalities.
The example of schools illustrates the potential for large differ-
ences in the capitalized value of a home. Consider two middle-class
residential areas, the first in a municipality with excellent schools, the
second in an area where all middle-class children attend private
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schools because public schools are judged to be inadequate. Many
other attributes may yield differential prices in housing, but we will
ignore these here. Assume again we have two otherwise identical
houses in two communities and that residents of the second must pay
to send their children to private schools which they consider compa-
rable to the public schools in the first. What will be the capitalized
value of schools implicit in the price of the house in the municipality
with good schools? Assume that families have two children, private
schools cost $3,000 per pupil per year, and that the interest rate is
10%. Home buyers will be willing to pay a premium to live in the
first community up to the total cost of private schools. They will be
exactly indifferent between the two houses if the difference in price is
$60,000.1 If the price difference is anything less, new purchasers
would choose to live in the city with good schools, raising the prices
of these houses while lowering the prices of houses in the other com-
munity. The process works in reverse if the difference is greater than
$60,000.
The capitalization process also captures the value of various forms
of regulation and land use control. Imposing environmental regula-
tions that make it more difficult to build new homes (e.g., restricted
access to water or sewage systems, or restricting permits for building
on undeveloped land) must increase the value of existing homes since
fewer alternative homes will be available. Whereas, without these
regulations, potential buyers have the choice between existing homes
and new homes, now they are faced only with existing homes and bid
up prices for these homes.
This effect also carries over to zoning regulations. It is well known
that the same piece of land can have two disparate values depending
upon the menu of legal uses. Thus, a corner lot may sell for a much
higher price if it is zoned for commercial rather than residential use.
This is precisely what is meant when we say that the value of an asset
reflects its potential uses. The capitalization process extends to nearly
all relevant dimensions of land, not simply zoning restrictions. We
shall see that this process has important implications for zoning often
overlooked by urban planners and legal scholars.
I. $60,000 is the maximum amount of money a family with two children would
borrow at 10% interest rates to purchase a home in an area with good schools instead
of a home in an area with bad schools. In this example, we are ignoring certain
technical questions such as the length of the decisionmaking time horizon; these are
made for purposes of illustration and do not affect the qualitative nature of the
results.
1982]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
Before turning to the economics of property rights, let us briefly
review some of the empirical studies of the effects of the capitaliza-
tion process. In the last fifteen years, economists have begun to ex-
amine the extent and importance of the capitalization process. The
results provide evidence for the view described above, namely that
important elements of the physical or legal environment are indeed
capitalized into the value of property.2 Perhaps the best reference for
a legal audience is the work reported by Inman and Rubinfeld.3
Writing in the Harvard Law Review, they investigate judicial reform
of the local fiscal process which attempts to create a more equal dis-
tribution of local services and taxes. Important judicial initiatives in-
clude efforts to force intra-jurisdictional service equity (all residents
should be entitled to the same level of service regardless of their tax
contribution) and equalization in property tax valuation methods
within a given jurisdiction. Inman and Rubinfeld argue that the ef-
fects of these rules become capitalized in the value of local property.
Because individuals may respond to changes in property values by
relocating across municipal boundaries within a metropolitan area,
they may undo much, if not all of the efforts to enforce equity. In
their words,
Unfortunately, the gains [from these policies]-often envisioned
by lawyers and courts as the "likely" outcomes-may disappear
if the local economy is permitted to adjust to new legal rules.
The fluidity of the urban economy is considerable; there are
strong economic forces at work which tend to undo, wholly or in
part, the potential achievements of legal reform.4
A host of other studies support our views. Earlier work by Ridker
and Henning found that local pollution is capitalized in the value of
homes: high levels of sulfur dioxide pollution in an area depress
property values.' Oates, in a classic study, showed that both school
2. In addition to the evidence summarized below about environmental factors
capitalized into housing values, there is a large and growing literature in finance that
shows how important environment factors (e.g., regulations, antitrust actions, plane
crashes, and so on) and expectations are regularly capitalized into the value of
financial instruments such as stocks and bonds. While no non-technical survey of
these findings exists, the literature is surveyed in Schwert, Using Financial Data to
Measure the Effects of Regulation, 24 J.L. & ECON. 122 (1981).
3. Inman & Rubinfield, Judicial Pursuit to Local Fiscal Equity, 92 HARv. L. RaV.
1662 (1979).
4. Id. at 1665.
5. Ridker & Henning, The Determinants ofResidential Propert Values with Spe-
cial Reference to .4ir Pollution, 49 Rnv. ECON. & STATISTiCS 246 (1967).
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quality and property taxes are capitalized into housing prices.6 More
recent works, generally using better quality data,7 have found similar
types of effects. Grether and Mieszhowski, one of the first studies to
use data on individual houses, show that a variety of effects is capital-
ized into housing prices.8 Finally, Mieszkowski and Saper demon-
strate that the negative effects of airport noise reduce residential
property values.9
II. ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
The existence and enforcements of rights in property, both tangible
and intangible, underlie the production of income and wealth in any
society. These rights are the key to attaining levels of income above
subsistence. Consider a farmer planning the coming year's activities.
The sequence of growing crops necessitates considerable investment
before the fruits of his labor mature. The farmer must prepare the
land; invest his labor-planting, irrigating, and so on; and finally har-
vest his crops. A crucial component of this decision often taken for
granted in this country is the security of property rights. The ex-
pected gain from his investment depends upon the security of the
farmer's rights to his crops; that is, whether anyone may harvest them
(no security) or if there is a significant degree of protection. To the
extent that security in ownership is uncertain, the farmer must dis-
count the potential gains. The greater the uncertainty, the lower the
investment and consequently the lower the level of income. In the
extreme, lack of protection leads to lack of production. The point is
that the existence of rights to production underlie any economic
system.10
6. Oates, The Effects of Property Taxes and Local Public Spending on Property
Values, 77 J. POL. ECON. 957 (1969).
7. The early studies used aggregated data on housing values, ie., they measured
housing value by the median house value in a census tract or in an entire municipal-
ity. More recent studies have used data on individual houses.
8. Grether & Mieszkowski, Determinants of Real Estate Values, I J. URB. ECON.
127 (1974).
9. Mieszkowski & Saper, An Estimate of the Effects ofAirport Noise on Property
Values, 5 J. URB. ECON. 425 (1978).
10. Economists have been successful in applying this approach to alternative
property right structures such as those present in the socialist economies. See, e.g.,
Furubotn & Pejovich, Property Rights, Economic Decentralization, and the Evolution of
the Yugoslav Firm, 1965-72, 16 J.L. & ECON. 275 (1973). Professor Douglas North
also discusses several different property right structures as they emerged in different
nations in the modem world. See D. NORTH, STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE IN
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From an economic point of view, several questions are relevant for
structuring different systems of rights governing the means of produc-
tion. What are the consequences of different forms of property rights
or legal controls over resource use? What forms of control maximize
the welfare of a community? And particularly relevant for local land
use control, how are incompatible uses of neighboring properties to
be handled?
In order to answer these questions, we need to discuss some ele-
ments of property rights systems." We emphasize that the economic
analysis of property rights differs significantly from that made by le-
gal analysts. These distinctions are useful to the extent that they
teach us about important policy issues such as problems of incompat-
ible uses.
There are three essential components to a complete and efficient
property rights system. These are the right to exclusive use of prop-
erty, the right to income from the property in any use, and the unen-
cumbered right of alienation. Each of these elements plays an
important role in economic exchange. Moreover, significant
problems arise if any component is incomplete or subject to impor-
tant qualifications. We shall take up each component in turn.
Exclusivity can be seen to be necessary because it underlies the
relationship between investment and return. As indicated in the il-
lustration of the farmer, incomplete excludability leads to losses in
income production. An important, if extreme example of non-ex-
cludability is the common property resource where no one may be
excluded from using a given piece of land, asset, or other propey.
12
Under these circumstances, no one has an incentive to worry about
the future of the asset. Each individual instead faces incentives to
ECONOMIC HISTORY (1981); D. NORTH & R. THOMAS, RISE OF THE WESTERN
WORLD (1975).
1I. Several useful treatments of this topic include the collection of articles in Eco-
NOMICS OF LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS (H. Manne ed. 1975). See also DeAlessi, Econom-
ics of Property Rights: A Review of the Evidence, in 2 RESEARCH IN LAW AND
ECONOMICS 1 (1980). Coase, The Problem ofSocal Costs, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
See also R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1976); H. Demetz, Toward a
Theory of Properly Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REv. 347 (1967).
12. For further analysis of this problem, see Hardin, The Tragedy of the Com-
mons, 162 Sdl. 1243 (1968); Cheung, Structure of a Contract and the Theory of Nonex-
clusive Resource, 18 J.L. & ECON. 49 (1970). See Smith, The Economics of the
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overuse the asset. Since no factors control or coordinate use, the re-
source is depleted or exhausted.
Consider the problem of grazing cows on a common pasture land
for the production of milk. Suppose the maximum yield of milk in-
volves 10 cows-adding additional cows means there is not enough
grass to go around and the whole herd produces less milk in total.13
If the community owns less than 10 cows, no problems arise. How-
ever, if there are more cows, will individuals have an incentive to
restrict the number of cows they pasture so that the total is not
greater than 10? The answer is no. Consider an individual deciding
whether to add an additional cow. While this implies that total milk
production goes down, his private production of milk increases; the
decrease is borne by the owners of other cows.' 4 If there are enough
cows in the community, pasturing may be so intensive that the sur-
vival of the pasture itself is not insured.
13. The following table gives the hypothetical relationship between the number of
cows and milk production. For simplicity we are ignoring all other costs associated
with grazing cows.
Total number Milk/cow Total milk produced















The maximum yield of milk occurs when 10 cows graze on this pasture. Adding more
cows reduces the total amount of milk available to the community.
14. Continuing with the hypothetical example from footnote 13, suppose each of
ten individuals owns one cow, Total milk production is maximized and each individ-
ual gains 10 gallons of milk. Now, suppose that some individual has an additional
cow. Will he choose to add the cow, thereby increasing the size of the herd to 11 and
thus decreasing the total milk yield to 96? The answer is yes. The decrease in pro-
duction is borne by all others who now receive but 9 gallons/cow. The individual
adding the cow, on the other hand, now receives 9 gallons from each of two cows for a
net gain of 8 gallons. As each individual behaves similarly, the total milk production
trickles down to nothing.
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Here, the consequence of non-excludability is overgrazing. More
generally, the consequences include the depletion and ultimate ex-
haustion of the resource. The same does not occur however for pri-
vate ownership. This is obvious for the case of one individual
owning all the cows. Alternatively, if someone owns the land and
charges a fee, then contracting will lead to no more than 10 cows,
since this maximizes the net gain.
Non-excludability is a serious problem even in the modern world.
It underlies the current conflicts over resources such as minerals, in-
ternational fishing grounds, and whales. The potential extinction of
the whales due to overgrazing by the Japanese and Russians is a di-
rect consequence of non-excludability. Air and water pollution pres-
ent a more dangerous consequence. Since no one owns these
resources, there are no limits to access. Polluters treat air and water
as free resources, hence overuse them. The difficulties in devising an
efficient regulatory scheme for air and water pollution suggest how
important these rights are.
The second feature of a complete property rights system is the right
to enjoy income from the possible uses available for the land. This
underpins maximization of community wealth since only unrestricted
use allows resources to be adapted to uses valued by the community
and the economy. To see the necessity of this proposition, simply
consider what income generation means. Larger income in one use
than in another implies that members of the community, on the basis
of their own actions, judge one use higher than another. The fact that
a piece of property is much more valuable when used as a local gro-
cery store than as an apartment complex means members of the sur-
rounding area value the convenience and services provided by the
grocery store more than would-be apartment dwellers value the prop-
erty as a potential residence.' 5
Restrictions on potential use impose barriers in the process of se-
lecting the use that is most valuable to the community. This becomes
particularly relevant as preferences, technology, and demographics
change. Unencumbered usage allows transformation of resources
from activities which may have decreased in value to currently more
valuable activities. Restrictions upon this process cause economic de-
15. Decisions about land use are made through calculations by developers who
maximize their profits based upon their ex ante expectations over the likely success of
alternative strategies for development.
[Vol. 23:385
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol23/iss1/13
ZONING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS
cline in the face of change since resources fail to move into higher
valued uses and remain in lower valued uses.
The final component of a complete property rights system is alien-
ability. Only when resources can be fully and voluntarily transferred
may they move to their highest valued use. Restrictions on voluntary
transferability inhibit investment activities since they attenuate the
capture of the rewards of investment. Investment, whether in the
form of current maintenance of capital or of improvements, will not
take place if its rewards may not be captured.
If these conditions govern the use of property, then the private in-
teraction of economic decisionmakers will maximize community
wealth. No property use controls or regulations are needed. There is
no economic justification for property rights controls beyond enforc-
ing the underlying system of exclusivity and transferability.
Problems arise only if this system is incomplete, whether by design
(e.g., legal restrictions) or of necessity (e.g., complete exclusivity
fails). Important failures of a complete property rights system as out-
lined above stem from high or prohibitive enforcement costs. Crime,
for example, is a direct violation of exclusion. We now turn to the
policy implications for one type of potential problem that also arises
from the failure of the exclusivity condition.
III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INCOMPATIBLE USES
An important aspect of the real world not present in a perfect prop-
erty rights system is the possibility of incompatible uses of property-
that is, uses of one piece of property which significantly and nega-
tively affect the use of adjacent property. This occurs because of the
failure of the exclusivity condition. If exclusion were perfect, then
negative external effects from adjacent properties would be ruled out.
In practice, it is impossible to exclude many such effects. From an
economic point of view, however, incompatible uses are not a suffi-
cient condition for legal control of property rights. The issue requires
a deeper analysis to determine the circumstances under which private
exchange or contracting fails to fully solve this problem. The analy-
sis above implies that there is no direct necessity for public control if
private parties solve these problems. We shall see that controls are
only justified when two conditions hold: (1) the existence of incom-
patible uses; and (2) the existence of an impediment to private bar-
gaining and contracting solutions.
The first implication of our above discussion for incompatible uses
1982]
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follows from the capitalization process. Since the price system capi-
talizes relevant factors which affect land values, the price mechanism
avoids many potential conflicts. To see this, consider the sequential
location problem of a housing area and a garbage dump. First, sup-
pose there exists a garbage dump and an adjacent piece of open land.
A housing developer has the choice of developing this piece of land
or choosing some other piece not adjacent to a garbage dump. How
will the developer make his decision without land use controls? If the
price of land is nearly equal or if the price of land near the dump is
higher, he will clearly prefer the one not located near the dump.
Since potential home buyers dislike living near dumps, they will pay
less for such homes. He may earn greater profits by developing land
away from the dump. But what if the price of the land near the
dump is relatively low so that this difference more than compensates
potential homebuyers for living in an unattractive area? Only when
consumers, exercising their free choice, feel that the price difference
more than compensates them for the disadvantageous location will
developers choose to develop the property near the dump. Thus, no
problems arise even though no controls exist.
What about the case in reverse, where a housing development ex-
ists first and a garbage company is deciding where to locate, either
near the housing development or in another place removed from
houses. The process of capitalization discussed above implies that
the potential use of the land adjacent to the houses for additional
houses of similar quality will become capitalized into the value of the
land. The adjacent land's price reflects the value in its best potential
use. If the undeveloped tract is relatively desirable for residential de-
velopment, this use will be capitalized into its price. The garbage
company, in choosing where to locate its dump, must of necessity
take into account the location of nearby houses. The company will
prefer to locate in other undeveloped areas which do not have the
potential for becoming housing tracts, and are therefore cheaper.
In neither case were controls necessary to yield the proper location
decisions. The price mechanism insured that incompatible uses of
adjacent land did not become a problem. Would the result have been
different under controls? Here, controls may actually harm home
buyers. Controls that do not allow housing developments near gar-
bage dumps rule out the possibility of lower cost housing in less de-
sirable areas. Developers will only find this location profitable if
potential home buyers find houses in these locations worth purchas-
ing. Under these circumstances, potential home buyers have a choice
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between cheap homes in locations with some undesirable (but not
debilitating) characteristic and homes in more expensive and more
desirable areas. However, in the presence of controls, only more ex-
pensive homes exist. Thus, some people who would have purchased
the cheaper homes now find themselves priced out of the market.
Secondly, because more people wish to purchase the desirable homes
when no cheaper substitutes exist, the price of these houses must be
higher than if there were no controls.
Let us extend this logic to an additional case of interest. Suppose a
plot of land is perfect for a particular use with one exception; a neigh-
boring plot houses an incompatible use. If there are no impediments
to bargaining,' 6 then bargaining between the two parties can achieve
the optimal mix of land use. If the location is so desirable and the
use so valuable to ultimate purchasers or consumers of the develop-
ment, then the profits from this venture should exceed the profits
from not developing the land (which allows the existing property to
remain in its current use). This implies that a bargain can be struck
whereby the owner of the resource with incompatible use will sell.
Indeed, it is common for developers to buy out several different types
of existing owners in pursuit of their plans. Most problems of incom-
patible uses are a simple extension of this logic. Indeed, only in the
presence of substantial impediments to bargaining will this process
fail. 17
These examples show that in many cases thought to justify land
use controls, economic decisionmakers already receive the appropri-
ate signals for development through the market price mechanism.
The capitalization process insures that land values reflect potential
uses and hence relative desirability. To the extent that the capitaliza-
tion process works, there may be little need for public controls.
The logic of the capitalization process undermines the rationale for
comprehensive land use controls. The capitalization argument shows
16. Impediments to bargaining generally go under the heading of transactions
costs in the economic literature. These relate to fundamental problems that inhibit or
prohibit the relevant parties from arriving at an appropriate agreement. See Coase,
supra note 1 I. Excellent discussions are also contained in Buchanan, Politics, Prop-
erty, and the Law An Alternative Interpretation of Miller et al. v. Schoene, 15 J.L. &
ECON. 439 (1972); R. POSNER, supra note 11, at 27-52.
17. An example here is large numbers of potentially affected parties on one side of
the transactions. Problems arise if any one of these parties becomes a holdout by
trying to extract all the value of the contract. This is the economic rationale for emi-
nent domain. See R. POSNER, supra note I1, at 39-44.
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that the benefits from this system are, even in principle, less than
often thought. Moreover, controls can often work to the detriment of
the capitalization and market price signalling mechanism. To the ex-
tent that usage is restricted, market prices will not reflect the highest
valued use, only the highest valued use allowed. With binding con-
trols, more services of a particular type may be needed, but, because
land use is restricted, resources do not move into this type of activity.
Moreover, to the extent that revitalization, renovation, and neighbor-
hood change is an incremental process, comprehensive structured
land use controls may inhibit this process unnoticed by planners. On
the other hand, if prices may adjust incrementally, the decisions
which occur through uncoordinated private decisionmaking become
easier. This is especially important for unforeseen trends in develop-
ment which only become apparent once the process has proceeded.
Two further policy implications follow from the logic of capitaliza-
tion. First, uncertainty over property rights imposes costs on owners
of land and consequently on the potential consumers of the goods
and services the landowners provide. Uncertainty about the nature
of property rights inhibits economic decisionmakers from making
long-term investments whose value varies with redefinition of prop-
erty rights. For example, developers may choose not to hold particu-
lar pieces of property for future use if unpredictable controls govern
the use of the land. This type of risk, particularly when caused by the
political system, has widespread and subtle effects. An example from
utility regulation illustrates this point. Uncertainty over the rate
levels allowed by a given public utility commission directly affects the
return on investment. As a result the utility faces higher borrowing
costs in the national capital markets since investors must discount the
return on investment by the probability that the public utility com-
mission will make adverse decisions which lower the return below
that expected at the time the funds were raised."i
Similarly, uncertainty over the future course of zoning patterns in a
given area will inhibit development. Developers are more reluctant
to undertake projects with long periods between inception and com-
pletion where changes in zoning may substantially reduce the value
of the investment.
The second point involves nearly the reverse of the first. Consider
18. Systematic evidence of this effect is found in K. Lehn, L. Benham, A. Ben-
ham, Ideology, Investment Expectations, and Economic Efficiency (1981) (Working
Paper No. 14 in Washington U. Dep't. of Economics).
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the case of an unexpected shift of property rights where there had
previously been little uncertainty about those rights. The change in
rights changes the uses to which the land may be put, significantly
affecting the value of the land. If a piece of land has some value in its
most valuable use, and zoning disallows this use, then the value of
the land must fall. While not a compensable taking under current
legal interpretation, it constitutes an unambiguous loss for the land-
owner. Consider, for example, a piece of land with an ocean view.
Suppose that the only productive use of this land is through housing.
As we have seen, the price of the land reflects its value in this use.
This remains true even if the current owner chooses not to develop
the land. Similarly, it does not matter whether the owner is a large
commercial developer or a couple who have spent twenty years sav-
ing to build their retirement home. Now, suppose land use controls
are radically altered so that there is a long term freeze on building in
this coastal zone. The value of this land must fall since it has no
other use. The uncompensated loss borne by the owners of the land
is independent of the rationale for the controls.
Consider the effects of uncertainty over property rights where the
uncertainty takes the following form: rules governing land use are
changed regularly and, while it may not be easy to predict which
rules will be altered in the future, everyone knows that no rule is
sacred. The most obvious effect is that land values fall, reflecting the
uncertainty over whether the current potential will be realized. Sec-
ond, any type of project, development, etc., which takes place over
time is inhibited since the potential returns for completing this pro-
ject must be discounted by the probability that the rules will change
during the course of the project and make the entire project useless.
As a direct consequence borrowing rates for investment in this area
must rise to reflect the uncertainty over the value of the collateral.
Finally, and in a similar vein, if a company is searching nationwide
for an area to locate a new facility, this type of uncertainty represents
a direct cost which must be figured into the investment calculations.
Other things being equal, the company will locate the facility in the
area in which the property rights are most secure.
In sum, economic decisionmakers considering long-term invest-
ments necessarily take into account uncertainty over property rights.
Areas in which the value of investments may be substantially altered
through changes in property rights are generally avoided, or like
South Africa, require substantially above normal returns to attract
investment funds.
1982]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
IV. APPLICATIONS TO CURRENT PROBLEMS
This discussion of property rights and the process of capitalization
has implications for several problems raised in the articles which
follow.
Managed Growth. Many different trends in law affect the growth
of metropolitan areas. One recent possibility is court enforced provi-
sion of a certain percentage of low income housing by all cities within
a metropolitan area. The economic effects of this thrust are twofold.
First, one primary service provided by certain suburbs is the exclu-
sion of families in the middle and lower income ranges. Many tools
are available to municipalities to restrict the type of residents. These
include minimum lot size, prohibitions on apartment complexes, the
complete absence of sewer systems (so that all dwellings must have
cesspools, thus ruling out large apartment complexes), and so on. In-
deed one particularly perceptive scholar argues that the bulk of the
growth of new cities in the Los Angeles area during the last twenty-
five years provided residents with minimal service cities. 9 The im-
portance of these cities for potential residents is their low tax rates.
Middle and upper income families pay a substantial premium in the
price of their house in exchange for lower taxes and for the protection
from future taxes. Judicial enforcement of low income housing di-
rectly intercedes in this process. This hinders the ability of cities to
practice exclusionary zoning as well as lowers property values in
those municipalities which practice exclusionary zoning.
Second, as Inman and Rubinfeld argue,20 the potential benefits
from this type of policy for local families are substantially lower than
anticipated by those advocating these policies. This follows because
wealthier communities with the most attractive fiscal resources tend
to be located far away from poorer neighborhoods, and hence from
the jobs held by poor people. The transit costs alone may completely
erode the potential benefits of this policy. Thus, even with the appro-
priate changes in zoning, these units may never be successful. If this
occurs, it is tantamount to throwing away the land. In this case, the
original price of the land prior to rezoning measures the net resources
lost from this policy.
19. G. MILLER, CInEs By CoNTRAcT (1981).
20. Inman and Rubinfeld, supra note 3, at 1738.
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Blighting. One major impediment to bargaining occurs when
larger numbers of parties are on one side of a potential transaction
than on the other. This may substantially reduce the ability of one
party to put several interdependent properties to their best use. Not
only do direct costs of negotiating increase with the number of par-
ties, but strategic bargaining problems become important. For exam-
ple, if many parcels are necessary for the success of a project, then
one particular owner may hold out and extract a price greater than
the value of his property because his parcel is key to the success of the
entire process. It is one thing when an oil company is searching over
many different corner lots to locate its next station-competition
among land owners of different corner lots insures that no one land
owner may extract a price greater than the value of the land. How-
ever, when many different pieces are all essential, this type of compe-
tition is no longer present.
Thus, if a developer plans to combine a set of parcels into a rede-
velopment project, he may face strategic behavior from current own-
ers who either wish to extract a greater price up front for their
property or who wish to remain owners and free ride on the invest-
ments made by the developer. Owners pursuing the latter strategy
hold their property until its value rises with the success of the project
around him.
Eminent domain powers can in principle solve this problem."'
They are not always called for, however. New developments are con-
stantly undertaken and it is not obvious why redevelopment of
blighted areas is any different from development of new areas. It
may be that the greater number of subdivided parcels exacerbates
bargaining costs, but the burden of proof that this is true must fall on
those favoring such powers for redevelopment.
Solar zoning. Of the issues taken up below, solar zoning is the
most straightforward in economic terms. Since problems of various
sorts occur through uncertain property rights, the main implications
of the approach outlined above is that property rights to the sun
should be unambiguously defined. Then individuals will be able to
reallocate these rights through contracting and bargaining. Market
forces provide the appropriate incentive for proper utilization of
sunlight.
21. See supra note 17 regarding the economic rationale for eminent domain.
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Spot zoning. This issue is no different from any other type of zon-
ing or variance policy. As argued above, there is no economic ration-
ale for comprehensive controls. Ironically, many of the situations
which call for spot zoning are simply failures of the existing system
because it is too restrictive. Spot zoning becomes viable in the pres-
ence of imperfect use of controls. Moreover, because uncertainty
over property rights is capitalized into the value of property, fears
above spot zoning may erode the value of a wide variety of parcels in
the area, thereby inhibiting investment decisions. Thus, if a commu-
nity currently has little land zoned to industrial use and housing de-
velopments are built within this set of property rights, then the
restrictions on the possibility for nearby industrial facilities are capi-
talized into the value of these homes. However, if a developer can
cheaply purchase land whose low price reflects the residential restric-
tion and then controls are relaxed through spot zoning, the surround-
ing land owners may experience a substantial loss in value of their
homes reflecting the unattractiveness of the new neighbor.
Undesirable uses. The problems at which some exclusionary zon-
ing is aimed (preventing uses such as adult entertainment districts,
abortion clinics, or group homes), is basically the same as that in-
volved in spot zoning. There is some use of land to which residential
users object either because of the activity allowed or a feared decline
in property values. Many of the examples considered involve uses of
land by a public body such as the city or state government. To the
extent that these uses do reduce the value of neighboring property,
they represent a nonphysical taking without compensation by the
government. Exclusionary zoning is often an attempt to insure
against such a loss in property value associated with undesirable use.
Of course, these issues may also go beyond simple economic concerns
to include other political purposes such as Catholic support for re-
moving abortion clinics or even policies which mask covert forms of
discrimination.
Protecting developer's rights. Here the interesting situations occur
when someone acquires property to develop in a certain manner but,
at some later time, the municipality changes the zoning laws to pro-
hibit this intended use. First, as noted above, this constitutes an un-
ambiguous loss imposed on the developer that is independent of the
purpose of the zoning change. Moreover, as noted above, since the
price of the land reflects its potential uses, owners of land may well
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experience a direct economic loss from changes in zoning even if no
work has been undertaken. What happens if compensation is re-
quired only when the project is far enough along so that physical
initiation of the project has occurred? Clearly, land prices for unde-
veloped land must fall to reflect the uncertainty that the current use
may not be allowed in the future. Consider a developer who holds
many more parcels of land than can be developed at one time. Sup-
pose that compensation is allowed from losses due to zoning changes
only if the project is physically initiated. Then uncertainty over the
security of current zoning rules imposes risks on the developer be-
cause he may lose substantial sums of the various parcels he is hold-
ing but not yet developing. This, in turn, raises development costs
since interest rates on land acquisition funds must rise to reflect the
greater uncertainty over the future value of the land. The uncertainty
over property rights is directly capitalized into the value of the land,
further raising the cost of borrowing. Lastly, the uncertainty directly
inhibits projects of long duration between inception and completion
because of the risk they will be prematurely forestalled.
V. POLITICAL USES OF LOCAL CONTROLS
We argued above that unregulated markets solve many of the
problems thought to justify local land use controls. Potential
problems from incompatible uses and so on simply provide no sup-
port for ubiquitous and comprehensive land use control. If this is so,
then why do we observe the pervasive use of these controls? In this
section we argue that the imposition of these controls affords local
officials substantial political advantages. Advocates who focus on the
benefits which in principle may be derived from a particular policy
rarely face the issue of the political uses of local controls.
A major problem for any type of public regulation, including local
land use control, is that its intended purpose is rarely the only use to
which the policy may be put. The history of regulation is replete with
examples in which politicians subvert laudable mandates to quite dif-
ferent political purposes. A host of examples have been elegantly
surveyed elsewhere.2 No matter how laudable in principle is the ra-
22. More than 25 years ago, Marver Bernstein chronicled the history and per-
formance of the major regulatory agencies. He found that regulation more often
served the industry being regulated than the laudable purposes for which the agency
was designed. See M. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COM-
MISSION (1955). Since then, the literature on regulation has provided even more sup-
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tionale for regulation, regulation in a political environment will serve
its most important political purpose. Rarely is it possible in a polit-
ical setting to remove the potential for exploitation by politicians
serving particular interests.
The relevance of this discussion for local land use controls be-
comes clear by looking at the role. these regulations play in the local
political environment. We conclude that even f there were no social
rationalefor land use control, politicians wouldfind it in their interest to
invent controls.23 Controls create the potential for politically directed
transfers of income, one of the most compelling motivations for any
political action. The income transfers are of two sorts. First, restric-
tions on the number of plots available for a given use raise the value
of those plots. Second, the plots which are denied this use are of
lower value. Careful targeting of the gains under the first category
rewards specific constituents. The second category leads to an even
more curious political situation because it creates the potential for
political gain through variances or changes in restrictions. As long as
the participation of the local politicians favorably affects an appeal to
the zoning board (e.g., a letter, phone call or personal appearance),
even random initial zoning decisions are valuable for politicians. Fi-
nally, the greater organization of special interests-whether these be
developers, large land owners or renter cooperatives-combines with
the ability of politicians to affect the impact of restrictions and biases
the implementation of land use controls away from economic and
community welfare criteria in favor of political uses.
Local land use controls thus become a tool for local deci-
sionmakers to target economic gains and losses. Judicious use of this
tool can work to the political advantage of local officials. While there
are always counterbalancing losses, 24 careful targeting of the gains to
port for the general proposition that agencies serve political purposes beyond those
provided in the mandates. For elegant surveys of the modem literature, see S.
BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1981); Joskow & Noll, The Theory and
Practice of Public Regulation, in STUDIES IN PUBLIC REGULATION (G. Fromm ed.
1981). See also M. Weidenbaum, The Impacts of Government Regulation (1978)
(Working Paper No. 32 in Center for the Study of American Business, Washington
U.).
23. The arguments of this section are further developed in Weingast, Shepsle &
Johnsen, Political Economy ofBenefits and Costs, 89 J. POL. ECON. 642 (1981). This
reference discusses the political issues surrounding the policy implementation and
how politicians foster those policies that provide benefits to constituents. See also M.
FIOR NA, CONGRESS, THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT (1977).
24. Granting a variance to one parcel may increase its value but this change may
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particular constituents may allow politicians to avoid blame for pecu-
niary losses to others. Much of political behavior is the pursuit of
those activities for which politicians may simultaneously claim credit
for the benefits while avoiding blame for the costs.
There are three reasons why pecuniary gains are politically more
important than pecuniary losses.25 First is the "Robert Moses ef-
fect,"26 the observation that pecuniary gains in the form of increased
jobs, profits, and local tax revenue go to named individuals, firms,
and localities from whom the legislator may claim credit and exact
tribute. The pecuniary gains are targeted to particular constituents
while the pecuniary losses are often dispersed over large numbers,
many of whom are outside the politician's constituency. Second,
higher prices which generate the pecuniary losses may not easily be
distinguished from general price inflation, particularly if they must
work through several factor markets before ultimately increasing the
price of consumer goods.27 And third, those who gain are often more
concentrated and politically organized. They can reward politicians
in a manner that the diffuse opposition cannot counter. As Fiorina
and Mayhew emphasize, politicians survive on the basis of their abil-
ity to claim credit for the political benefits bestowed upon constitu-
ents.28 These three effects enable politicians to extract political
also negatively affect the value of other parcels-e.g., neighboring parcels or parcels
which were previously not restricted from the use allowed by the variance. Similarly,
overly restrictive zoning may afford landowners whose parcels are not restricted
higher land values, but ultimately this may translate into higher costs to consumers of
the local community because the restrictions hinder development of competitive pro-
vision of services.
25. Weingast, Shepsle & Johnsen, supra note 23, at 648.
26. So named for that famous New Yorker who exploited this principle so effec-
tively. For a lucid description of local politics associated with land development, see
R. CARO, THE POWER BROKER (1974). Caro carefully details the role of manipulated
local land use controls as well as contracting for local construction projects.
27. Consider the effects of a defense contract for fighter planes on the price of
airline tickets. The latter market is removed from direct effects of the defense expen-
diture, but nevertheless is affected indirectly. The contract increases demand in this
industry, thereby raising prices for industry outputs. This includes the price of com-
mercial airlines sold to major trunk carriers which, in turn, feeds into increases in the
price of air travel. Movements in the price of airline tickets, however, may not be
readily associated by the average air travelers with the defense expenditure. Thus, the
pecuniary gains to firms and employees in the defense industry are directly attributa-
ble to this contract whereas the pecuniary losses borne by consumers of air travel are
not associated with the policy. This allows politicians to gain credit for the positive
effects while escaping blame for the negative effects.
28. M. FioRiNA, supra note 23; D. MAYHEW, CONG.ss: ELECTORAL CONNEC-
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benefits because they may simultaneously avoid blame for part or all
the costs which fall on politically irrelevant individuals (i.e., those
outside their political constituency).
One final observation is worth noting. Two legal principles par-
tially support the opportunity for political discretion in the use of
local land use controls. First, the rules governing compensation to
landowners for changes in land use controls allow for political pur-
poses which might not be undertaken if the costs were visible or if
these costs were borne by the community. Historic preservation, for
example, may have substantial benefits to a community interested in
saving its prized local heritage, but the costs and benefits of this deci-
sion to local citizens differs markedly if they can impose the costs of
this policy on current owners. The decision may well differ if instead,
current owners were allowed compensation so that community pur-
poses were in fact paid for by the community. Second, judicial re-
view of local decisions is largely limited to procedural improprieties
and gross misconduct. There is no judicial test to determine whether
policy implementation in any way resembles the ostensible rationale
for controls. In general, procedurally correct local decisions, even if
they serve purposes beyond the rationale for control, stand up in
court.
In sum, the most important uses of local controls may well have
little to do with the laudable issues discussed by policy advocates.
The political environment in which these policies are administered
have systematic implications for the pattern of decisions which take
precedence over other public purposes.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this introduction, we discussed the law and economics of local
land use controls. Central to the paper were potential problems of
incompatible uses of adjacent pieces of land. We argued that, as a
consequence of the capitalization process, the market pricing mecha-
nism solves, at least partially, the problem of incompatible uses. Po-
tential problems from conflicts over use simply do not justify a
ubiquitous and comprehensive system of land use controls.
The policy implications of this view focus on the uncertainty over
the definition of rights. The fact that rights may be altered at some
TION (1974). These are two of the most famous scholarly treatments of the modem
Congress in the political science literature.
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point in the future has an effect on property values today as the risk
to future values is capitalized. The uncertainty over future rights
generated by the ability and inclination of a community to alter
rights (for whatever purpose) has a hidden and negative effect that
must be considered by policymakers.
Our inquiry leads to the second conclusion that laudable rationales
for land use control need not play a role in the implementation of this
policy in order for this system to be of political value. Social goals
embodied in incompatible uses or in the series of issues taken up in
this volume may have only the vaguest connection with the imple-
mentation and day to day operation of these controls. Therefore, we
caution policymakers concerned with the actual purposes underpin-
ning these controls to consider the likely consequences of implement-
ing different systems of land use regulation.
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